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scenarios, such as those involving Taiwan, might motivate China to attempt
to deter American intervention by the
threat of nuclear strikes or damage to
U.S. space assets.
O’Rourke’s study raises important questions as the United States develops a new
maritime strategy. If preventing Taiwan
independence and promoting reunification is the present focus of China’s naval
development, what other national interests might fuel such development in the
future? What is the proper balance for
the U.S. Navy between supporting operations in the global war on terror and
maintaining (if not increasing) its presence and operational capabilities in the
vast, strategically vital Asia-Pacific region? What resources will be required
to meet the latter requirements, and
how should they be allocated? Finally,
what fleet and basing architecture can
best accomplish this at sustainable cost
to taxpayers?
Critical procurement decisions with
ramifications for years to come are being made in Beijing as China develops a
new five-year plan. As this dual strategic crossroads looms ever larger, it is to
be hoped that the two Pacific powers
can reach an understanding about their
respective regional roles and thereby
keep competitive coexistence from degenerating into a new cold war.
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In China’s Nuclear Forces Larry Wortzel
has delivered an exceptional monograph that demands the attention of
both nuclear strategists and China experts. The author, a leading authority
on China, Asia, national security, and
military strategy, is currently serving as
a commissioner on the congressionally
mandated U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission. He previously served as the director of the Asian
Studies Center and vice president for
foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation. Wortzel’s distinguished thirtytwo-year career in the U.S. armed
forces, during which time he served as
both assistant Army attaché and then
attaché at the American embassy in
China, culminated with an assignment
as director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College.
The title of this monograph promises
an expansive scope, and Wortzel delivers quite ably. While the scale of the
work is extremely helpful in keeping the
various aspects and issues in perspective, the most important new contributions to understanding the evolving
Chinese nuclear posture are Wortzel’s
treatments of “no first use” and nuclear
command and control. As stated by the
author, “The major insights . . . come
from exploiting sections of . . . A Guide
to the Study of Campaign Theory[,] . . .
an unclassified ‘study guide’ for PLA officers on how to understand and apply
doctrine.” These insights, however,
which Wortzel so adeptly lays forth, are
corroborated in other reliable Chineselanguage material.
It has become conventional wisdom
among China scholars to take Chinese
declaratory policy of “no first use” of
nuclear weapons at face value, excusing
away various past unofficial statements
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suggesting that “no first use” ought not
to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel
offers a counterbalance to this view,
elucidating both the concept of preemptive counterattack and the current
debate within China on the viability
and utility of adherence to “no first
use.” His conclusion on this crucial issue is that the debate within China on
“no first use” is real, that a new generation of officers, diplomats, and scholars
leans significantly toward modifying or
jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In
fact, this conclusion is quite in accord
with the one developed and briefed by
the Mahan Scholars student research
team at the Naval War College in the
spring of 2007.
Regarding nuclear command and control, Wortzel finds that the originator of
valid firing orders for the Second Artillery is the Central Military Commission
(CMC), “the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party.” While we
would agree that tongshuaibu, or “supreme command,” probably refers to
the CMC in the context of nuclear release authority, this is not completely
clear, and explicit phraseology to bolster that conception was uncomfortably
dropped from defense white papers of
2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other
writings it appears that conventionalmissile firing authority during conflict
is certainly delegated downward, to the
Second Artillery itself. Such delegation
is, of course, to be expected, but in a
conflict that involved the movement of
nuclear forces and became intense, the
concomitant risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent nuclear missile launch
would grow alarmingly.
In addition to solid scholarship regarding the question of “no first use” and
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nuclear command and control, this
monograph offers substantial original
material on missile-force readiness levels, survivability issues, and targeting.
Overall, as expected from an academician
of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands
our understanding of the Chinese nuclear posture. As such, it demands the
attention of all China specialists and
nuclear strategists.
CHRISTOPHER YEAW
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Ralph D. Sawyer, noted scholar of Chinese strategic thought, has produced an
enlightening study of the beginnings and
the evolution of deception in Chinese
political and military history. Contrary
to some contemporary commentators,
China has a long martial tradition.
Warrior leaders and military heroes
permeate both historic and contemporary Chinese literature, as well as modern movies. Deception has long been an
integral part of Chinese warfare. Drawing on the classic works of Chinese military thought, Sawyer demonstrates that
deceptive practices and unorthodox approaches are the norm rather than the
exception. Deception is a fundamental
tenet of Chinese strategic culture, one
that permeates strategic thinking not
only in the military realm but also in
the diplomatic, information, political,
and economic spheres. (Readers of
Sawyer’s previous work, The Tao of
Spycraft, reviewed in the Winter 2007
issue of this journal, will recall that
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